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Trade in the 1990s: Is an International
Organization for Multinational
Enterprises Needed?
ANTHONY SCAPERLANDA*

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, as preparations were being made for the meetings
that first led to the Havana Charter for the International Trade
Organization ("ITO") and ultimately resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), foreign direct investment
("FDI") was relatively insignificant. Over the half century since then,
as tariff barriers have dropped dramatically and other trade barriers
are in the process of being addressed, FDI exploded as multinational
enterprises ("MNEs") increasingly expanded their "global reach."'
Consequently, voices have been raised in favor of monitoring and
"controlling" MNEs through an international organization for multinational enterprises ("OMNE"). This Article explores the need for
such an organization and its possible responsibilities. 2 Preceding this
exploration, this Article examines FDI in relation to international
trade theory; proceeds to view the growth, current size, and changing
importance of FDI; and surveys two theoretical perspectives of internalization theory that examine the reasons for MNE expansion. This
introduction establishes the context within which the Article analyzes
the need for and probable scope of an OMNE. In identifying the
scope of an OMNE, this Article builds on the foundations laid by
Paul Goldberg and Charles Kindleberger, 3 and Fred Bergsten and
4
Edward Graham.
Professor of Economics at Northern Illinois University.
1. FDI can reasonably be considered the direct investor's (DI) actual equity
in its foreign affiliates in addition to any liabilities that foreign affiliates have to the
Dl.
2. For a further discussion of MNEs and FDI, see Anthony Scaperlanda,
Multinational Enterprises and the Global Market, 27 J. EcON. ISSUES 605 (1993).
3. Paul L. Goldberg & Charles P. Kindleberger, Toward a GA TTfor Investment: A Proposal for Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 L. & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 295 (1970). "As the scope of a multilateral agreement narrows, its
probability of ratification increases." Id. at 320. Thus, Goldberg and Kindleberger
*
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I. THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
At least since 1819, when David Ricardo revised Adam Smith's
Theory of Absolute Advantage into the Theory of Comparative
Advantage, many policy makers and most economists have recognized
the economic advantages of unimpeded international trade.' The
subsequent theoretical expansion posited by Eli Heckscher 6 and Bertil
Ohlin 7 only strengthened the theoretical foundation for free trade.
Further, neither the domestic implications of the above theoretical
theory analyzed by Wolfgang Stopler and Paul Samuelson,8 nor the
tests of this theory initiated by Wassily LeontieP have substantially
modified this vision. Underlying all of this theoretical superstructure
is the explicit assumption that factors of production, including FDI,
do not move internationally.
Contemporary trade theory and policy essentially continue to
espouse the benefits of free trade with nuances such as a recognition
that political priorities may substantially subordinate economic
considerations 0 and a formulation of strategic trade policy with
market imperfections incorporated into the theoretical model." Generally, the role of FDI in achieving international equilibrium is not
incorporated into models that set forth the conditions for attaining
international general equilibrium.
II. THEORIES OF TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
There are, however, several prominent theoretical developments
outside the central theoretical core. Robert Mundell is usually credited
with modifying trade theory to account for the possible simultaneous
suggest that an OMNE will be more politically feasible if it is targeted as GATT
rather than being both "multilateral in format and comprehensive in scope" as was

the draft charter of the ITO. Id. See
SUGGESTED

CHARTER FOR AN

UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION

OF THE UNITED

(1946) (providing a draft charter for the ITO).
4. Fred C. Bergsten & Edward M. Graham, Needed: New InternationalRules
for Foreign Direct Investment, 7 INT'L. TRADE J. 15 (1992).
NATIONS

(1978);

5. See

JAMES

MILTIADES CHACHOLIADES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY AND POLICY
E. MEADE, TRADE AND WELFARE (1955).

6. Eli Heckscher, The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income,

in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1950).
7. BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

(1933).

8. Wolfgang Stopler & Paul A. Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages, 9

REV. OF ECON. STUDIES

58 (1941).

9. Wassily Leontief, Domestic Production and Foreign Trade; The America
Capital Position Re-examined, in READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 503 (1968).

10. See STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS AND ENDOGENOUS
POLICY THEORY: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (1989).
11. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1990).
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international movement of capital of which FDI is one form. 2 Mundell postulated that capital movements substitute for trade flows in
the process of equalizing relative commodity and factor prices (attaining international equilibrium). 3 Andrew Schmitz and Peter Helmberger later introduced the perspective that in some instances FDI and
trade may be complements. 14 Raymond Vernon's Product Life Cycle
theory of trade is a third theoretical formulation of the trade-FDr
relationship. 5 His theory purports to explain international shifts in
comparative advantage as results of product standardization and
technological diffusion. One avenue of technical diffusion could be
FDI. Thus, the trade and FDI interactions can be viewed as substitutes, 16 complements, 17 or as alternating over time as production
technology changes. 18 The precise relationship between FDI and international trade that is observed will vary by industry and the timing
of the observation. Whatever the trade/FDI interactions' cause, theoretical developments since the framing of the Havana Charter have
woven FDI into the fabric of the global specialization process. Consequently, some formulations of contemporary trade theory suggest
that any initiative to recapture the "Spirit of Havana" regarding
international trade must concurrently either directly incorporate articles specifying the rights and responsibilities of MNEs or develop a
FDI parallel to the GATT or its successor.
III. MNE's

IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Empirical evidence to support the contemporary importance of
FDI can be found in at least two forms. First, the statistics on the
growth in size and importance of FDI are an indicator of the increased
importance of MNEs. 19 Second, the evolution of the activities of

12. Robert A. Mundell, International Trade and FactorMobility, in
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 101

READINGS

(1968).

13. Id.
14. Peter Helmberger & Andrew Schmitz, Factor Mobility and International
Trade: The Case of Complementarity,.60 AM. REV. 761 (1970).
15. Raymond Vernon, InternationalInvestment and International Trade in the
Product Cycle, 80 Q. J. ECON. 190 (1966).
16. See Mundell, supra note 12.
17. See Helmberger & Schmitz, supra note 14.

18. See Vernon, supra note 15.
19. The world stock of direct investment more than tripled between 1980 and
1992. See JOHN RUTTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE BOOM YEARS FADE 38 app. table 2 (1993).
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GATT may yield additional, relevant evidence.20 A survey of the
motives behind MNE expansion and possible responsibilities of national governments in dealing with MNEs will complete the perspective
within which an OMNE is considered.
A.

GENERAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

As evidence that the importance of multinational enterprises has
expanded dramatically since the Havana Charter, especially in the last
quarter century, 2 FDI (the parent firm's equity in its foreign affiliates)
increased over eleven times to 1,284 SDR billion in 1991.22 Regarding
the need for a "General Agreement" or an OMNE, the changed
national composition of FDI is probably more important than its
growth. In 1973, when the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime
ended, United States firms were the source of 4870 of FDI, European
firms 39076, and Japanese firms only 4.9%.23 The 1991 profile is
dramatically different: United States firms 25.4070, European firms
52.107o, and Japanese firms 12.6%.24 Dramatic shifts have also occurred among countries that host FDI. For example, in 1973, Canada
was the host country to 16% of the world's FDI; in 1991, it was host
to only 6% .25 Over this time period, the importance of the United
States as a host country increased from 10076 to 22%; Europe's
importance increased from 38% to 43%; while Japan's position was
little changed at less than 1%.26 These data support at least two
conclusions. First, they verify that global integration of production
and distribution is rapidly progressing through the expansion of MNEs
as well as through international trade. Second, they indicate that the
national identity of the firms participating in the global integration
process as foreign investors is becoming more diverse.
20. When the Uruguay Round began the role of Trade Related Investment
Matters had not been considered in GATT negotiations. As the negotiations progressed, they came to be incorporated. For example, see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES (1989) [hereinafter GATT ACTIVITIES].
21. This is measured via Special Drawing Rights (SDR's). Because the SDR is
more stable than any of the currencies upon which it is based, it is a relatively neutral
and conservative unit by which to measure changes in FDI over time. If the U.S.
dollar were used as the unit of measure, the recorded growth would be substantially
greater.
22. See Rutter, supra note 19, at app. table 2.
23. RUTTER, supra note 19, at app. table 2.
24. RUTTER, supra note 19, at app. tab. 2.
25. RUTTER, supra note 19, at app. table 7.
26. RUTTER, supra note 19, at app. table 7.
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EVIDENCE FROM GATT'S EXPERIENCES

The importance of multinational enterprises manifested itself in
the late 1980s within The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.
Several proposals concerning trade-related investment measures
(TRIMS) were tabled during 1988.27 However, "the Ministers agreed
that the Group should continue identifying the trade-restrictive and
distorting effects of investment measures in the light of the operation
This process continued with a "Draft
of GATT articles .... ,,28
Agreement" on Trade Related Investment Measures, which was
adopted when the Uruguay Round was successfully concluded. 29 Central to this agreement is the specification that a nation cannot place
restrictions on an MNE which would require it to use local inputs or
obstruct the import of inputs into the production that the firm
undertakes.30 Likewise, requiring an MNE to export a stated amount
or percentage of its output as a condition for permission to locate in
a country is prohibited. 3
C.

MNE GROWTH: GOVERNMENT GOALS AND ENTERPRISE MOTIVES

Government is assumed to pursue policies that aim to benefit at
least some of its citizens. Ideally, a government will implement policies
that benefit all its people. If producers were perfectly competitive,
the self-regulatory force generally known as the "invisible hand"
would minimize the need for government participation. But, as the
infant-industry argument has long signified in the theory of trade
policy,32 all producers are not equally competitive at any point in
time. In this context, government can be seen as having a responsibility
to ensure that its citizens are not oppressed by dominant producers
(or buyers in a monopsonistic setting). This means, stated positively,
27. See GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 20, at 52.
28. GATT ACTIVITIES, supra note 20, at 52.
29. The agreements reached during the Uruguay Round are in the process of
being ratified by the national legislatures (parliaments) of the GATT's Contracting
Parties.
30. See DRAFT FINAL ACT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE § N, Annex 1 a & b and Annex 2 a & b (1993) [hereinafter
DRAFT ACT].

31. Id. § N, Annex 2c.
32. The infant industry argument is that new industries may need temporary
protection (while in their infancy) until competitive management, production, and
marketing techniques have been mastered. That is, protection is needed until the
industry's survival is possible without it.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

that government is responsible to ensure that its citizens participate
fairly in the rewards (rents) of international trade or of the activities
of a MNE. The working premise of this Article is that a government's
motives in dealing with MNEs are to ensure that all of its citizens are
treated fairly.
In practice, it is seldom clear what "fair" participation is.
Competition among several MNEs seldom is sufficient to provide an
answer. Consequently, government policy is formulated to adjudicate
questions of fairness. But each government presumably represents its
own citizens. Therefore, conflicts can arise between home and host
country governments over questions such as the distribution of tax
revenue between the two entities.33 Government-MNE conflicts may
also arise between the home country and MNEs, as occurred in the
United States with the Foreign Direct Investments Program, 4 but
questions more often arise between the government of the host country
and the MNE over matters such as domestic content of output or
export requirements.3"
This Article assumes that the motives of a MNE are determined
by a central core of top management; specifically typified by a
hierarchial power structure in which owners minimally participate.
Sufficient pecuniary returns to keep owners content as minimal participants are an obvious motivation of the MNE management. To
determine whether an OMNE is needed, the additional motives that
drive managers to expand and operate a multinational enterprise must
be understood. Should an OMNE be needed, a second determination
to be made is what articles of agreement must be negotiated.
The dominant theory that explains the growth of MNEs is
internalization theory, which is usually based on transaction cost
theory. 6 Alfred Chandler's evolutionary theory of the firm competes
33. Such conflicts may arise because, "It is practically beyond question that
multinational companies manipulate internal price relations so as to locate their
profits either in the country of the mother company or in countries where taxes are
lowest. This behavior entails tax losses for host countries," and will lead them to
attempt to reduce their losses either vis a vis the MNE or the MNE's home country.
Fernand Braun, InternationalControlfrom the Standpoint of the EuropeanEconomic
Community, in

DON WALLACE,

JR. INTERNATIONAL

CONTROL OF INVESTMENT:

DUSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

54 (1974).

THE

34. See Anthony Scaperlanda, Direct Investment Controls and International
Equilibrium: The U.S. Experience, 18 E. ECON. J. 157 (1992). These problems
occurred specifically from 1968 to 1975.
35. Evidence of this can be found in the draft of GATT's TRIMS accord. See
DRAFT ACT, supra note 30, at Annex.
36. This theory holds that for a MNE efficiency gains result from the firm
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with transaction cost theory as the foundation upon which internalization theory is based." Succinctly, and with specificity, Chandler
compares transactions cost and the evolutionary approaches to internalization theory when he says: "For Oliver Williamson, the leading
figure of this [transaction cost] approach, asset specificity and bounded
rationality and opportunism (the primary causes of information asymmetry) determine whether transactions costs will be lower if they are
internalized within the firm than if they are left to be carried out in
external markets. ' 38 Rather than emphasizing "the transaction as the
basic unit of analysis," 3 9 Chandler maintains that "it is the firm and
its specific physical and human assets" that should be the basic unit
of analysis.4 His position is that internalizing the monitoring of
manufacturing, management, and marketing processes is more important in capital-intensive industries .4 1 Even among capital-intensive
industries, the pressure to internalize differs "from industry to indusof production,
try because the source of supplies, nature of technology
4
1
vary.
all
markets"
of
requirements
and
size
the
and
Based on the premise that market imperfections lead a firm to
internalize monitoring processes, the transaction-cost internalization
theory of MNE growth provides answers to the following questions:
(1) Why do firms adopt FDI instead of exporting or licensing as
strategic alternatives for serving foreign markets; (2) How can foreign
firms, given their extra costs, compete with local firms; and (3) Why
do firms not use imported supplies from unrelated firms rather than
sourcing from FDI projects? 43 Chandler's evolutionary approach to
internalization theory provides more general answers to these three
internalizing production and marketing activities rather than "out sourcing" the
activities to participants in the market place. That is, the total cost of transactions

for internally handled activities is less than the costs for the same activities carried

out in competitive markets.
37. Alfred D. Chandler, OrganizationalCapabilitiesand the Economic History
of Industrial Enterprise, 6 J. EcON. PERSP. 79 (1992). See also Richard R. Nelson,
Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does it Matter, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 61 (1991);
Sidney G. Winter, On Coase, Competence and the Corporation, 4 J. L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 163 (1988).

38. Chandler, supra note 37, at 86.

39. Oliver E. Williamson, Strategizing, Economizing and Economic Organization, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 75, 79 (1991).
40. Chandler, supra note 37, at 86.
41. Chandler, supra note 37, at 86.
42. Chandler, supra note 37, at 86.
43. Thomas L. Brewer, Effects of Government Policies on Foreign Direct
Investment as a Strategic Choice of Firms: An Expansion of InternatalizationTheory,
7 INT'L TRADE J. 111, 113 (1992).
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central questions." Within this framework, the accumulated technology would still favor internalizing expansion within the firm rather
than relying on markets external to the firm even if all market
could be eliminated. 45
imperfections
Essentially, Chandler's more general theory
of the multinational
enterprise first postulates that international expansion of a known
technology is relatively easier than domestic expansion into new
industries and markets that require investments in new physical and
human technologies.4 6 Second, it postulates that a firm will internalize
its international expansion and become an MNE rather than extending
its global reach by exporting or by licensing processes or products if
the following three conditions pertain: (1) a firm is sufficiently capital
intensive to require extensive expertise and skills for success; (2) the
minimum efficient plant size is small enough to eliminate the cost
advantage of producing from a single plant; and (3) the host-country's
market is of sufficient size and otherwise favorable. 47 The product
life cycle represents one process through which a potential MNE can
evaluate host country market conditions. FDI will substitute for trade
only when these three conditions are accompanied by a fourth: high
barriers to imports in the potential FDI host country. 48 Among the
other two hypothesized trade-FDI relationships, the first condition,
"sufficiently capital intense" may require that trade and FDI be
somewhat complementary.
II.
A.

SOCIAL

CONTROL OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

IS THERE A NEED?

Adam Smith's argument that producers and consumers, if left to
pursue their respective self-interests, would be guided by an "invisible
hand" to promote the best interests of society implicitly recognized
an "optimal and fair" distribution of output. 49 Smith also recognized
that the optimal solution would not be achieved if producers colluded.50 In addition to collusion, other market imperfections including
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Chandler, supra note 37, at 99.
Chandler, supra note 37, at 89.
Chandler, supra note 37, at 94.
Chandler, supra note 37, at 89.

48. See Mundell, supra note 12, at 102.

49. See

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS

50. Id.

(1776).
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imperfect knowledge on the part of producers as well as consumers
have prevented market forces from adequately "controlling" industry.
Consequently, all countries have introduced some form of public
5
control to supplementthe control exerted by market forces. ' This
anti-trust legislacontrol has ranged from public ownership through
52
taxes.
or
subsidies
behavior-modifying
tion to
Government intervention into producer-consumer interactions in
private markets is often controversial. Nevertheless, it is likely to
continue, especially if the producer's economic power seems sufficiently imposing to threaten to exploit the citizenry. This will be
especially true when the MNE headquarters are located in a political
jurisdiction different from the production or distribution facility in
question. The government of a country that hosts foreign investment,
in the name of protecting the well-being of its citizens, often finds
53
compelling reason to place limits on the actions of MNEs. Domestic
content and export requirements placed on MNEs are two examples.
As the TRIMS discussions within GATT indicate, the host governis potentially contentious and therefore in
ment-MNE relationship
54
OMNE.
need of an
Conflict can also arise between the home and host governments,
creating another potential point of controversy. If each government
assumes responsibility to secure a portion of a firm's output for its
citizens, conflict may arise and an OMNE may be needed to adjudicate, for example, the division of tax revenues between an MNE's
home and host country. Another point of contention could arise
between MNE and its home country government if that government
has balance of payments or industrial policy goals that conflict with
the MNE's goals. These conflicts are domestic in nature and therefore
will be handled by the courts in the home country rather than entering
the realm of an OMNE.
51. See R. Krishnamurti, The Developing Countries' Point of View: II, in
supra note 33, at 116. Krishnamurti says "varying degrees of screening
and control" have been introduced by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
India, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico (now being eliminated vis-A-vis U. S. and Canadian
firms as a result of the NAFTA), Pakistan, and the Philippines.
52. Krishnamurti, supra note 51, at 117.
53. The Cartagena Agreement on Common Treatment Capital, Trademarks,
Patents, Licensing Agreements, and Royalties that was part of the implementation
of the Andean Common Market is an example of an attempt to protect the citizens
of a country or region that hosts a MNE. Krishnaumurti, supra note 51.
54. See BEROSTEN & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 36-38, for an example of these
discussions in an extra-GATT context. For a summary in a GATT context, see GATT
ACTIVITIES, supra note 20, at 52.
WALLACE,
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The general policy positions taken by such international agencies
as the IMF, the OECD, and more recently by the GATT since the
end of World War II have provided a supportive infrastructure for
MNE expansion." National governments have not always been supportive. During the 1960s and 1970s, countries such as Canada and
France attempted to restrict incoming FDI,5 6 and the United Kingdom
and the United States attempted to restrict FDI outflows. 7 In the
1980s, most nations formulated policy that is more supportive of
MNE expansion. 8 Generally, one can say that international "governance" of MNEs is and has been generally supportive of MNE
expansion; however this support has been somewhat diffused. National policies are uncoordinated but more pro-MNE now than prior
to 1980.19
B.

PROPOSED STRUCTURE OF AN OMNE

Recognizing first that there is a need to coordinate and possibly
adjudicate some relations between the host country and an MNE,
between host and home countries, and possibly between home country
government and a MNE; and recognizing, as well, that there is no
agency filling these needs, this Article proposes central features of an
operational OMNE. This proposal assumes that two aspects of Chandler's evolutionary, technology-driven approach to internalization theory pertain: that MNE expansion is inevitable and generally favorable;
and that uncoordinated or contradictory national policies that thwart
FDI' are institutional impediments to the fair distribution of MNE
growth benefits.60
At least four questions underpin the formulation of an OMNE
proposal. First, what rules or guidelines are needed to facilitate the
growth of MNEs? Second, what safeguards are required to insure
that the rents generated by MNEs are dispersed "fairly" to all parties
with a compelling interest in an MNEs activities? 6' Third, in establish55. In general, the order and stability that the IMF has brought to foreign
exchange markets and the reduced barriers to the movement of goods that has
resulted from GATT negotiations facilitate MNE expansion.
56. See C. Torem & W. L. Craig, Developments in the Control of Foreign
Investment in France, MICH. L. REV. 285-336 (1971).
57. See Scaperlanda, supra note 34.
58. John H. Dunning, Governments, Markets and Multinational Enterprises:
Some Emerging Issues, 7 INT'L TRADE J. 1, 9-10 (1992).
59. Id.
60. See Chandler, supra note 37, at 98-99.
61. An additional point to ponder is whether such a dispersal is fair.
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ing guidelines and safeguards, is it preferable to harmonize rather
than eliminate practices? Fourth, what are the most efficient procedures to handle conflicts between parties with a compelling interest in
an MNE's activities?
Transparency, predictability, and permissiveness are three characteristics of MNE regulations that could facilitate the growth of FDI.
Transparent regulations are universally understood. As such, they can
be followed with minimum cost and if they hamper efficient resource
utilization by an MNE, they are more easily addressed in negotiations
because they are clearly understood. In other words, if regulations
are clear and understandable, they will be less burdensome in the
short run and more malleable in the long run. Predictability is
important because ever-changing regulations will inflate the cost of
compliance and may result directly in enterprise losses. Finally, permissive regulations will interfere least with the application of technological innovations. By definition, technological change will encounter
institutionalized, unfriendly practices and ideas. The less entrenched
these unfriendly practices, the more efficiently technical progress will
be achieved. In short, a setting in which regulations are permissive,
stable, and understandable will interfere least with the growth of
MNEs, and can even serve to organize and guide MNE expansion as
well as minimize conflict between a MNE and the host or home
country.
MNEs will benefit if an OMNE simplifies, reduces, or eliminates
obstructions to their technologically driven expansion. From a broad
social perspective, this could have the undesirable result of concentrating the gains that result from the success of a MNE primarily in
the hands of owners and/or top management. MNE expansion among
industrial countries is likely to increase competition in the short run,
thereby increasing the likelihood that some of the benefits are distributed more widely through lower prices than would otherwise be the
case. Thus, excessive concentration of gains may not occur in the
short run. Regardless, national governments may find it desirable/
necessary to establish, even in the short run, consultative procedures
and practices in the event this short-run competition stimulates
"downsizing" of the labor force, a process that effectively shifts most
of the costs involved in MNE expansion onto the dismissed workers.
In the longer run, governments will want to establish safeguards
against MNE expansion leading to excessive concentration of power.
One approach available to a national government to avoid excessive concentration of economic power is to encourage small and
medium-size enterprises as the European Union (EU) is attempting to
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do. 62 If nations adopt this approach, an OMNE will have to include
articles that permit tax credits, subsidies, marketing assistance, training assistance, etc. to assist "infant industry."' An OMNE's articles
will have to be written to insure equal treatment of domestic and
foreign firms within a given national jurisdiction. The articles should
also attempt to define guidelines for terminating assistance to "infant
industry." That is, the "point" at which the infant industry reaches
maturity must be defined. An OMNE could encourage competition,
as well, by establishing mechanisms to increase the flow of accurate
information to producers and consumers. For example, a procedure
whereby all potential government contracts are publicly announced
through channels accessible to all potential bidders will encourage
smaller firms to participate, at least as bidders.
Many of the TRIMS that have been identified within the Uruguay
Round negotiations can be viewed as an attempt by the host country's
government to assist domestic infant industry. 63 Domestic content
requirements in manufacturing, for example, can be used in this way.
An OMNE could establish general norms for reasonable domestic
content requirements and guidelines or limits on what other assistance
the country that hosts the FDI can provide to the firms supplying the
domestically produced inputs. An. important norm for an OMNE to
establish is that domestic content requirements are permitted only if
secondary MNEs have the same opportunity as domestic firms to
participate in supplying the principal MNE from host country production facilities. Articles of agreement of this sort recognize the
responsibility of the host government to appropriate for its citizens a
"fair" portion of the rents resulting from a MNE's activities. 64 Articles
of agreement can minimize the discouragement of foreign investment
in at least two other ways. First, the reduction of uncertainty provided
by such regulations will affect FDI positively. Second, known and
clear regulations, rather than ad hoc and vague regulations, facilitate
the possibility of negotiating modifications of them.
Existing MNEs call for other control strategies. An OMNE will
have to establish guidelines for antitrust policies, at least to insure
that mergers and acquisitions are not detrimental to the well-being of
the general citizenry of both the host and home countries. The EU
process for monitoring large mergers offers a model for OMNE
62. Declan Costello, Policiesfor Industries, in THE ANNUAL REvmw OF EUR131-32 (1991).
note 30, at § N. Section N of the Draft Final Act
is composed of nine Articles, plus a Preamble and an Annex.
64. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
OPEAN COMMUNITY AFFAIRS 1990
63. See DRAFT ACT, supra
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5
articles dealing with merger review. 6 It should be noted, however,
that some observers think that mergers will not be frequently modified
or rejected by the EU."6 If the monitoring of mergers is to be
ineffective or totally permissive, the effort will not be constructive
since it will both avoid protecting the general citizenry and will impose
additional costs on firms and taxpayers. Furthermore, an OMNE code
that forces MNEs to avoid restrictive business practices is an important
complement to merger-monitoring guidelines. Such a code will be
difficult to formulate because the history and culture of different
' 67 If such a code
nations result in varying definitions of "restrictive.
can be developed, however, it will not only work to protect the
citizens' welfare in the several countries, but will also establish a
universal standard that may result in the home country government
placing fewer restrictions on MNEs headquartered within its jurisdiction.
If an OMNE is to promote cooperation and openness among
nations, host countries will have to agree to avoid supply-side, beggarthy-neighbor policies. That is, even if some fiscal inducements to
attract FDI are permitted, nations should be discouraged or prohibited
from attracting industry with "promises" of unrestricted freedom.
An OMNE, in protecting the citizens of its members, should include
articles that set minimum environmental standards and general standards for worker safety. In addition, an OMNE might establish
guidelines for such matters as worker severance pay and procedures,
worker participation with management, access to medical care and
education (including retraining), minimum holidays, and other socially
desirable goals. The general context of regulations and guidelines in
this category is that FDI should not be distorted by a government's
policy that allows the MNE to profit by avoiding a socially desirable
expenditure.
Responsibilities on the part of each enterprise parallel the rights
and protections that an OMNE would bestow on MNEs. In addition
to adherence to the regulations and guidelines of an OMNE, each
MNE will be specifically responsible for avoiding restrictive business
practices. Because for cultural and historical reasons, a general and

65. See Anthony Scaperlanda, The European Community and Multinational
Enterprises: Lessons in the Social Control of Industry, 26 J. EcON. ISSUES 421, 426
(1992).

66. See, e.g., JOHN GROENEWEGEN, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (1992).
67. In some countries, such as the United States, individuals are not permitted
to sit on the boards of directors of "competing" firms. In other countries, individuals
are not restricted from doing so.
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precise understanding of what is a restrictive business practice is
difficult to obtain, Bergsten and Graham have suggested classifying
such alleged practices into two groups. 6 The first group includes
practices of which all countries disapprove. 69 Such practices would be
prohibited. A second category includes business practices that are not
universally considered restrictive. 70 These practices would be discouraged. The avoidance of restrictive business practices, together with
the general attitudes and actions associated with good citizenship,
should facilitate a relatively fair distribution of a MNE's rents.
Home countries have occasionally placed restrictions on MNEs
for reasons of national security and balance of payments equilibrium.
There is, moreover, pressure in some countries to slow the outflow
of FDI in order to "keep jobs at home,"'" although this pressure has
not explicitly influenced public policy and is rendered irrelevant by
Chandler's description of MNE expansion. 72 The balance of payments
argument for restrictions is also negated by the ideas of Chandler and
others.7 3 The experience of the United States is that, at best, home
country restrictions have a temporary effect.74 This leaves national
security as the only serious reason for a home country to restrict the
activities of one of its MNEs. In the contemporary world, nations
may want to restrict exports as well as FDI to nations that foster
terrorism. In keeping with the ideals this Article envisions for an
OMNE, identification of such a nation should be multilaterally determined. Within an OMNE framework, as a general rule, home countries should not unilaterally impose restrictions on outgoing FDI.
Furthermore, the government of the home country should be committed to working cooperatively with the government of the host
country on matters such as sharing tax revenues.

68. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 15.
69. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 30. An example of such a practice is
the MNE's headquarters requiring that subsidiaries obtain supplies only from another
subsidiary regardless of the availability of the supplies from extra-MNE sources at
more competitive prices.
70. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 35. In this category, cartels are
banned by some countries, but approved or, at least, ignored by others.
71. The recent Ross Perot harangue against NAFTA centered on the alleged
"great sucking sound" of FDI and jobs being drawn to Mexico from the
United
States. Larry King Live, NAFTA Debate, Transcript 961-1 CNN, Nov. 9, 1993,
Screen 57, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Transcripts File.
72. Chandler, supra note 37, at 83-99.
73. Chandler, supra note 37, at 83-99. See also Scaperlanda, supra note 34.
74. See Scaperlanda, supra note 34.
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The question to be addressed now is whether harmonization of
policies and practices is preferable to forcing some countries to change
policies and/or abandon practices in order to enable MNE growth
and to secure some benefits of that growth for the general citizenry.
An approach that requires changes other than harmonization of
policies is likely to be confrontational, at least, between governments.
Confrontational encounters between governments or between an MNE
and a government are unlikely to produce an environment within
which MNEs can maximize their contributions to society. John Dunning takes the position that emphasizing the harmonization of policies
toward MNEs effectively represents "a movement from viewing governments and markets as substitute (or confrontational) forms of
macro/micro-organization, to viewing them as complementary (or
cooperative) forms." 71 Dunning goes on to note:
The conclusion we draw . ..is that . . .the organization of

the resources and capabilities [of MNEs] under their [national
governments'] jurisdiction in a global economic environment,
which, though market driven, is increasingly influenced by the
economic strategies of governments. To maximize the constituents' share of the rents generated by MNE activity is a
perfectly legitimate goal. The debate should not be centered
on whether governments should intervene more or less ...
but rather what kind of governance changes such investment
requires. Even if all structural market distortions were removed, the role of government as a systemic or individual
market facilitating force would still be a76 critical one, and one
which deserves more acknowledgement.
Host country and home country regulations and guidelines will always
influence MNEs. If national rules can be harmonized across nations,
MNEs will have to expend fewer resources to identify and to learn
rules and the means to comply with them. 77 The lower costs that result
75. See Dunning, supra note 58, at 10.
76. Dunning, supra note 58, at 10-11.
77. It should be noted that even when a government regulation seems to be an
irritant to a MNE, it may have the effect of improving the firm's global operation.
An example can be found in the U. S. Foreign Direct Investments Program require-

ment that each major United States MNE file a consolidated balance sheet for all its

affiliates. This requirement forced some MNEs to develop an overview of their
worldwide operations for the first time. For an example of such a form, see ANTHONY
SCAPERLANDA, THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN AFFILIATES OF U.S. DIRECT
INVESTORS 3 (1974).
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simultaneously permit more MNE expansion and enable the general
citizenry to participate more fully in the success of the MNE, perhaps
through lower prices.
There are points of contention between countries and between
countries and MNEs that must also be addressed by an OMNE.
Goldberg and Kindleberger, for example, identified potential points
of contention in "taxation, anti-trust policy, balance of payments
controls, export controls and securities regulation. ' 78 Bergsten and
Graham think an OMNE's codes should cover at least accounting and
reporting standards, transfer pricing and taxation, antitrust and restrictive business practices, the environment, and intellectual property.79 Negotiations and the dispute settlement process between countries
could follow a pattern similar to that used by the GATT.8 0 To
strengthen the GATT process, they propose patterning intergovernmental dispute settlement after the procedure embodied in the United
States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 8 1 Specifically they propose that
after the country that intends to initiate an action vis-A-vis another
country or countries notifies those parties in writing of that intention,
the two (or more) parties must enter mutual consultations and attempt
to solve the dispute between or among themselves.12 If the consultation
process is unsuccessful, the parties would bring their dispute before a
commission of peers for mediation within an OMNE.8 3 If a solution
is not found, the dispute would be submitted for arbitration. 84
"[M]andatory and binding arbitration would seem to be the best
means of last resort to settle all disputes." ' 81
In addition, for disputes between an MNE and a national government, a different process is warranted. 6 There probably is little
question that the central activities of an MNE are subject to the laws
of the nation in which it is headquartered. For activities within a host
nation, the host nation's laws should pertain. An OMNE would enter
the picture only in selected circumstances when there is a governmentMNE dispute. Bergsten and Graham identified three general cases.
78.
79.
80.
81.
(1988).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Goldberg & Kindleberger, supra note 3, at 298.
See Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 35.
Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 35-36.
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
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The first arises when a MNE is pursuing an extra-territorial activity
that a government thinks is detrimental to the interests of its citizens.87
The second arises if an MNE's officers believe that the host country
is treating the firm in a manner inconsistent with the obligations
agreed to within the OMNE. 8 In this case, an appeal to the OMNE
can be justified if all host country avenues for adjudication have been
exhausted. A third instance in which turning to an OMNE may be
wise is when the officers of an MNE think that one government is
imposing regulations or policies that contravene the regulations or
policies of a second government. For these three types of cases, a two
tiered adjudication process seems most effective.8 9 First, the claim of
injury would be taken to a review panel to determine if the case has
merit. To have merit a case would have to fall within the purview of
the OMNE, involve a suspected violation of some provision of the
OMNE accord, and be brought to the OMNE only after all national
avenues to a solution have been exhausted. Regardless of the reason
the case is brought to the OMNE, for any judgement to be effective,
nation states will have to forgo some sovereignty if a judgment is to
be effective. As a model for such a process, Bergsten and Graham
suggest the European Court, which currently deals with conflicts that
arise when European Union law holds an MNE to a different standard
than does national law. 90
CONCLUSION

There seems little doubt that foreign direct investment is important in promoting international equilibrium today to an extent that
was unimagined when the Havana Charter was drawn. The growth
of FDI is accompanied by a substantial increase in the range of
possible international conflicts. In this setting, it is reasonable to
conclude that the contemporary prominence of FDI justifies calls for
an Organization for Multinational Enterprises. Even though some
Trade Related Investment Measures were dealt with in the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations, the Draft Agreement on TRIMS is not
inclusive. Scholars who have written on the need for an OMNE
envision an organization dedicated primarily to FDI "oversight." The
87. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 36.
88. Bergsten and Graham do not specify host country. However, it is my
opinion that a dispute between an MNE and its home government will have to be
remedied within the national judicial system. An OMNE would not be given jurisdiction in such instances.
89. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 36-37.
90. Bergsten & Graham, supra note 4, at 36-37.
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time seems to have arrived to take up the call for negotiations to
create an OMNE. 9'

91. See Golberg & Kindleberger, supra note 3, at 323.

